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Abstract
We classify a large sample of banks according to the geographic diversification
of their international syndicated loan portfolio. Our results show that diversified
banks maintain higher loan supply during banking crises in borrower countries. The
positive loan supply effects lead to higher investment and employment growth for
firms. Diversified banks are stabilizing due to their ability to raise additional fund-
ing during times of distress, which also shields connected markets from spillovers.
Further distinguishing banks by nationality reveals a pecking order: diversified do-
mestic banks are the most stable source of funding, while foreign banks with little
diversification are the most fickle. Our findings suggest that the decline in financial
integration since the recent crisis increases countries’ vulnerability to local shocks.
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1 Introduction
The last decades saw a steady increase in the importance of globally active banks. Bank-
ing integration peaked around 2007, but declined sharply during the global financial crisis.
It has become a key objective for policy makers and academics to better understand the
effects of integrated banks on financial stability and the real economy (BCBS, 2013).
Several papers provide valuable evidence on the costs and benefits of lending by foreign
banks.1 However, an analysis of the consequences of banks’ portfolio diversification on
financial stability is largely absent from the literature.
In this paper we provide first cross-country evidence on how internationally diversified
banks adjust lending during banking crises in their borrower countries. We find that
diversified banks stabilize loan supply and smooth shocks. On the loan level, their loan
supply during crises is 3.9 % higher, compared to banks with a concentrated portfolio.
Higher loan supply has significant real effects on firm performance. Firms at the 75th
percentile in terms of loan exposure to diversified banks have 1.5 % higher loan growth
during banking crises, relative to firms at the 25th percentile. This translates into stronger
investment (4.6 %) and employment (1.1 %) growth. As detailed loan-level data allow us
to rigorously control for credit demand effects, the positive effects of diversification reflect
banks’ loan supply. We also find that the positive loan supply effects of diversified banks
are persistent. In the aftermath of a banking crisis, there is a permanent shift towards
lending by diversified banks within and across firms.
To measure the degree of portfolio diversification of globally integrated banks, we
use disaggregated data on worldwide syndicated lending. For each bank we construct
a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of the geographic diversification of its international loan
portfolio, aggregated to the parent bank level. Banks with low portfolio concentration,
i.e. those that lend to multiple countries, are classified as diversified. Our classification of
banks builds on recent literature on banking integration that shows that geographically
diversified banks have lower risk in their portfolio and cheaper access to funding during
crises (Bord, Ivashina and Taliaferro, 2015; Levine, Lin and Xie, 2017). They use their
1For theoretical papers highlighting the importance of banks’ diversification and intra-bank capital
markets, see Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2004), Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011, 2012), Kalemli-Ozcan,
Papaioannou and Perri (2013a), Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou and Peydro´ (2013b). For empirical evi-
dence on the internal capital market, see De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2010; 2014), Buch and Goldberg
(2014), Kerl and Niepmann (2014), Fillat, Garetto, Go¨tz and Smith (2017), and Gilje, Loutskina and
Strahan (2016). Claessens (2017) provides an excellent summary on cross-border lending.
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internal capital markets to reallocate funds towards regions with high loan demand,
thereby smoothing local economic shocks (Gilje, Loutskina and Strahan, 2016; Corte´s and
Strahan, 2017).2 Our measure reflects the positive effects of diversification on obtaining
and reallocating funds.
We provide evidence that geographically diversified banks are stabilizing due to their
ability to raise new funds during times of distress. If banks are financially unconstrained
when hit by a local financial shock, they can raise and distribute new funds to sustain
loan supply in affected areas, but also connected non-crisis countries. Banks that face
financial constraints must trade off where to allocate existing funds, similar to Stein
(1997). Local shocks will then have spillover effects on connected countries. For example,
during a banking crisis in Canada unconstrained banks can maintain lending in Canada
and Mexico, while constrained banks cut lending in both countries. We show that, for
highly diversified banks, maintaining loan growth in a crisis country has no spillover
effects on unaffected non-crisis, countries that borrow from the same bank. However, for
banks with a concentrated portfolio loan growth also falls in connected, but unaffected
borrower countries. We interpret this as evidence that diversified banks have looser
‘financial constraints’ and can raise and distribute new funds to sustain loan supply. Non-
diversified banks are financially constrained and must cut back lending in affected and
unaffected areas when faced with a shock. To provide additional direct evidence on banks’
liabilities, we further match a subsample of US banks with Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) data on depository institutions. In line with the hypothesis that
diversified banks have better access to funding, we find that they raise new deposits at
home during banking crises in borrower countries.
We contrast our categorization by diversification with the common classification in
the literature by nationality into foreign and domestic banks. Diversified banks can
be foreign or domestic, and foreign banks diversified or non-diversified. We find that
classifying banks by diversification instead of nationality uncovers strikingly different
behavior. While diversified banks stabilize loan supply during banking crises in host
markets, foreign banks reduce their loan supply, relative to domestic banks. Our results
2Gilje, Loutskina and Strahan (2016) show that banks distribute windfall profits through their branch
network, Corte´s and Strahan (2017) find that banks use internal capital markets to reallocate funds
towards regions with high loan demand. As in our setting, reallocation has negative effects on connected
areas of smaller and less diversified banks that cannot raise new funds. Bord, Ivashina and Taliaferro
(2015) provide additional evidence that large and healthy banks raise new deposits to smooth shocks.
Our measure reflects that diversified banks have better access to funds during distress and allocate them
through their intra-bank market.
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reveal the following pecking order: diversified domestic banks are the most stable source
of funding, while foreign banks with little diversification are the most fickle. Foreign, but
diversified banks occupy an intermediate position between both extremes. The ordering
speaks to findings on the flight home effect (Giannetti and Laeven, 2012) and behavior
of gross capital flows during crises (Broner, Didier, Erce and Schmukler, 2013).
For robustness, we address alternative explanations to the argument that diversified
banks smooth local shocks through better access to funding. We show that diversified
banks have lower portfolio risk in terms of volatility of borrower sales growth. While
a less risky portfolio could explain banks’ stabilizing effect, we show that the positive
effect of diversification remains stable once we control for portfolio risk. We then rule
out possibility that diversified banks extend a lower share of their total loans to countries
in crisis. Including the share of loans in crisis shows that, if anything, diversification
becomes more important when a larger share of loans is in distress. To further probe the
robustness of our results, we create an alternative measure of diversification that cap-
tures banks’ international orientation. We group banks by the share of loans extended
to foreign borrowers. Banks with a high share of international loans are categorized as
‘international’, those with primarily domestic loans as ‘national’.3 Our two classifications
are complementary and positively correlated, but capture different dimensions of banking
integration. We find that international banks are weakly stabilizing during host shocks.
However, once we include banks’ diversification in the regression, the effect on interna-
tional banks turns insignificant. Instead, we still find that diversification is the relevant
factor for positive effects on loan supply. We also ensure that bank size is not driving our
results. Further, findings are robust to excluding the global financial crisis, controlling for
correlated regional crises affecting several countries at once, or contemporaneous shocks
to home markets.
The key identification issue for cross-country studies using aggregate data is to con-
trol for loan demand. If diversified banks lend to different firms than banks with a
concentrated portfolio, any observed differential change in loan volume reflects both de-
mand and supply effects. Disaggregated data allow us to overcome this challenge. Our
loan level analysis employs firm∗bank and firm∗time fixed effects to absorb all time-
varying unobservable firm fundamentals.4 The combination of both fixed effects allows
3To exemplify the difference, think of a German bank that lends only to French firms. Under the
alternative metric (international portfolio) it is highly international, while in our baseline (diversification)
it is not.
4See Khwaja and Mian (2008); Jime´nez, Mian, Peydro´ and Saurina (2014a); Jime´nez, Ongena, Peydro´
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shocks to affect each firm at each point in time heterogeneously and accounts for any
change in loan demand.5 For example, time-varying fixed effects on the firm level absorb
changes in firm sales, management, or productivity, while bank∗firm fixed effects control
for distance between borrowers and lenders. On the firm level, we combine firm with
country∗industry∗time fixed effects to control for time-varying industry demand. The
identifying assumption is that loan demand by all firms within the same industry and
country changes equally. While in principle firm demand could exhibit heterogeneity
within industries, we run loan level regressions to confirm that this is of second order
importance. The positive effect of diversification on credit hence reflects loan supply
factors.
Our paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, and to the best of our
knowledge, we propose the first cross-country bank-level measure for banks’ portfolio in-
tegration into the global financial system. Due to data limitations, so far most studies
distinguish banks by headquarter location into foreign and domestic and look at cross-
border lending.6 While bank nationality has been shown to be an important determinant
of loan supply, our approach captures the related, but distinct dimension of banks’ inte-
gration into the financial system, captured by their portfolio allocation. This allows us to
shed new light on banks’ role during crises. Note that both categorizations need not be
mutually exclusive. Diversified banks can be foreign, but domestic banks also diversified,
depending on the country in which the shock originates. We find that grouping banks
by diversification instead of nationality uncovers new patterns that complement exist-
ing findings in the literature on banking integration. It also helps reconcile conflicting
findings on the effects of foreign banks during crises. The global scope of our detailed
loan-level data allows for clean identification, as well as external validity.
Second, we contribute to the growing literature that analyzes the real effects of fi-
nancial shocks and highlights the relevance of syndicated lending for firm performance.7
and Saurina (2014b); Morais, Peydro´ and Ruiz (2015).
5A related problem is self-selection that arises if, for example, the best firms would pair with diver-
sified banks. To overcome this potential selection bias, we repeat our analysis on the restricted sample
of firms that borrowed from both diversified and concentrated banks in each year (Khwaja and Mian,
2008). Coefficients for the reduced sample have the same sign and are of similar magnitude as for the
full sample.
6See, for example, Peek and Rosengren (1997, 2000); Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011, 2012); Schnabl
(2012); Correa, Zlate and Sapriza (2013); De Haas and Van Horen (2013); De Haas and Van Lelyveld
(2014); Ongena, Peydro´ and Van Horen (2015); Bremus and Neugebauer (2018).
7See Giannetti and Laeven (2012); Correa, Zlate and Sapriza (2013); De Haas and Van Horen (2013);
Hale, Tumer and Minoiu (2016); Jime´nez, Mian, Peydro´ and Saurina (2014a); Popov and Van Horen
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Our results show that the effects of banking crises are heterogeneous across bank types
and that firms’ composition of lenders matters. The negative effects we find on the firm
level suggest that firms cannot fully substitute syndicated loans across banks. If firms
could fully replace syndicated loans by non-integrated banks with loans by diversified
banks, exposure to either type would not affect loan growth differentially. However,
while substitution is imperfect, we show that in the years following a banking crisis there
is a persistent shift towards lending by diversified banks. Both within firms and within
industries, the share of loans extended by diversified banks increases. Geographic diversi-
fication allows banks to capture a larger share of the market when their local competitors
have to contract lending. Viewed from a different angle, this also implies that banking
crises persistently alter the composition of lenders.
Finally, while the effect of shocks to banks’ home markets and consequent spillovers
are well explored, few papers investigate the role of banks during distress in their host
markets.8 Many crises over the last two decades were shocks to borrower countries and
globally integrated banks were usually heavily involved. During the Asian crisis, Japanese
and European banks were exposed to markets in Thailand, the Philippines, or South Ko-
rea; and during Argentina’s woes, American banks had a strong presence in Latin Amer-
ica. As bank lending is a major source of firm financing, it is important to understand
how banks react to host country shocks. So far, the discussion has mainly highlighted the
costs and benefits of cross-border banking and how foreign banks spread home market
shocks to connected markets (Claessens, 2017).
Our results contribute to the discussion on retrenchment in financial integration since
the global financial crisis (Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2011; Claessens and Van Horen, 2015).
Since the financial crisis, there has been a significant decline in cross-border banking and
financial integration.9 In addition, we show that banks’ portfolio diversification declined.
The verdict on whether this is good or bad for financial stability is still out. While some
studies find that foreign banks adversely affect economic conditions in host markets, our
results show that integrated banks with a diversified portfolio smooth financial shocks.
Presence in several markets reduces banks’ exposure to local shocks and gives them better
access to new funds, which they can allocate towards countries in distress. This not only
stabilizes lending in affected countries, but also mitigates contagions. In light of our
(2015); Morais, Peydro´ and Ruiz (2015).
8For an exception, see De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2006).
9See also Cerutti and Claessens (2016); Bremus and Fratzscher (2015); Bussie`re, Schmidt and Valla
(2016); Emter, Schmitz and Tirpa´k (2016); European Central Bank (2017).
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results the recent decline in global banking is worrisome, as weaker integration into the
global financial system, and hence less portfolio diversification, has detrimental effects on
stability in host markets.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses data and empirical
strategy, Section 3 presents our main results. In Section 4 we check the robustness of
our findings to alternative explanations, Section 5 provides extensions and additional
robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data & Empirical Strategy
This section describes data and construction of main variables. We then discuss the
empirical strategy to identify changes in loan supply by banks during borrower-country
banking crises, as well as their real effects on firms.
2.1 Geographic Diversification
We categorize banks according to the geographic diversification of their international
syndicated loan portfolio. Building on recent literature, we argue that diversification
allows banks to access cheaper funding, which they allocate towards borrower countries
in crisis (Gilje, Loutskina and Strahan, 2016; Corte´s and Strahan, 2017; Levine, Lin
and Xie, 2017). The mechanism is especially important during episodes of financial
turmoil (Bord, Ivashina and Taliaferro, 2015). For each bank we construct a Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI), based on the share of outstanding loans to each borrower country
in each year. The index reflects the geographic dispersion of banks’ loan portfolios across
multiple countries. Based on the HHI, we then define diversification (DIV) for bank b in
year t as
DIVb,t = 1−
Jb∑
j=1
s2b,j,t ∈ [0,
J b − 1
J b
], (1)
where sb,j,t measures the share of a bank b’s outstanding loans to borrowers in country
j relative to its total outstanding loans in year t. Each bank is active in J b distinct
countries, i.e. where it has at least one borrower. We invert the scale of the HHI for ease
of interpretation. A value of zero (DIV = 0) implies no diversification (all credit goes to
borrowers from one country, what we will call concentrated portfolio), while higher values
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reflect increasing diversification of banks’ loan portfolios across countries. We reason that
banks with higher diversification have better access to funds during local financial shocks.
2.2 Data
For our main analysis and to construct banks’ diversification, we use data on worldwide
syndicated lending. We additionally use country-specific data and further information on
borrowing firms’ balance sheets. Loan-level data with detailed bank-firm relations comes
from Thomson Reuters Dealscan and covers the universe of syndicated loans. Compustat
(Global and US) provides firms’ balance sheet information. Macroeconomic variables
come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Finally, we use U.S. bank
balance sheet data from FDIC’s Statistics on Depository Institutions.
Laeven and Valencia’s (2013) Systemic Banking Crises Database provides country-
year-level information on episodes of financial distress.10 From 1995 to 2012, it reports
189 banking crisis (BC) observations. The two conditions that define a banking crisis are
i) significant signs of financial distress in the banking system (such as bank runs, losses
in the banking system, and/or bank liquidations); and ii) significant banking policy
intervention measures in response to the losses in the banking system. In our sample,
there is a concentration of financial turmoil around the time of the Asian crisis and from
2008 onward, during the Great Financial Crisis.
To construct main variables, we use Dealscan data on syndicated loans. Syndicated
lending constitutes a significant share of total lending. Around one-third of total inter-
national lending is done through the syndicated loan market (Gadanecz and von Kleist,
2002) and it is an important source of financing in both developed and emerging economies
(Cerutti, Hale and Minoiu, 2015). Syndicated loans are issued jointly by a group of banks
to a single borrower. The lending syndicate includes at least one lead bank (also called
lead arranger) and usually further participant banks. Lead banks negotiate terms and
conditions of deals, perform due diligence, and organize participants. Therefore, lead
arrangers stand in direct contact with the borrower and retain larger loan shares for
signaling purposes (Sufi, 2007). Participants are usually not in direct contact with the
borrower, but merely supply credit. Compared to other types of bank loans, syndicated
10While there exist different databases on financial crises, Laeven and Valencia is the most compre-
hensive for banking crises occurring after 1970 (Chaudron and De Haan, 2014).
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loans are on average larger in volume and issued to bigger borrowers.
Dealscan provides extensive information on syndicated loans at origination, including
loan amount, maturity, and interest, as well as identity of lenders and borrowers. All
data are aggregated at banks’ and firms’ parent level, consistent with the literature (Sufi,
2007). The aggregation of banks at the parent level captures the ability of banks to
make use of their internal capital market to allocate capital across borders.11 We re-
strict our analysis to loans by banks to non-financial firms and consider lending only by
commercial, savings, cooperative and investment banks.12 We keep both lead arrangers
and participants in our sample, and do so for two reasons. First, we are interested in
banks’ loan portfolio allocation across countries and not specific contractual frictions. As
the focal point of our analysis is total credit supply, including both lead arrangers and
participants provides a comprehensive picture of the syndicated loan market. Second,
excluding participants leads to sample-selection bias. Lead arrangers are large banks
operating on a global scale. We aim to compare banks along the dimension of their
international diversification. Hence, excluding smaller participant banks with a rather
concentrated portfolio will change the control group. Instead of comparing diversified
with concentrated banks, focusing on lead arrangers only will lead to a selected group of
globally active banks in our sample. We would compare banks’ diversification within a
group of diversified and internationally integrated banks. To avoid this pitfall, we include
leaders and participants in our analysis.
Loan level We decompose syndicated loan deals into loan portions provided by each
lender to obtain granular credit level data. Whenever Dealscan provides information on
lending shares of each bank, we use this information to split loan volume accordingly
(available for 28 % of the deals).13 In cases where lending shares are missing we split loan
volume on a pro-rata basis among all banks in a syndicate.14 Transactions with deal status
11Banks may choose to lend to a foreign firm either through direct cross-border lending or through a
subsidiary in the foreign market.
12In Dealscan, we use lender types Commercial Banks, Finance Companies, Investment Banks, Mort-
gage Banks, Thrift/S&L, and Trust Companies. Investment banks constitute 3 % of our sample and
excluding them does not change results. Borrower types included are Corporations, Insurance Compa-
nies, Law Firms, Leasing Companies and Other.
13See Giannetti and Laeven (2012); De Haas and Van Horen (2013)
14In the sub-case of partial information on loan shares, we first use the available information to allocate
loan shares. Then, we split the remaining amount equally among banks with missing information. If
the sum of the allocation rule is larger than 110 % we consider this an erroneous entry and treat it as if
lending share information was not available in the first place.
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‘canceled’, ‘suspended’, or ‘rumor’ are removed and all loan nominations transformed
into million U.S. Dollars (USD) using the spot exchange rate at origination, provided
by Dealscan. If after this allocation procedure the loan portion is smaller than 10,000
USD, we drop the observation to remove erroneously small loans (0.6 % of observations).
Overall, we split a total of 293,163 deals into 1,638,343 loan portions. We next use the loan
portions to construct each bank’s outstanding loan volume as a stock variable to proxy
the loan’s entry on the loan book (Morais, Peydro´ and Ruiz, 2015). Each outstanding
loan remains active until the end of its maturity. We aggregate all outstanding loan
portions between a bank-firm combination to obtain bank b’s outstanding loan volume
to firm f in year t, which we define as a loan observation.
To measure banks’ geographic diversification, we construct their distribution of cross-
border loans by destination country. Therefore, geographic diversification is based on
the nationality of the borrower at origination and not defined by the nationality of the
parent bank.15 For each year, we then aggregate all outstanding loans by each bank to
all borrowers from country j and divide by its total outstanding loans to obtain country
shares sb,j,t. We calculate diversification according to Equation (1).
Firm level To examine effects of credit supply on firm behavior, we merge our data set
with firm balance sheet information. We aggregate the firm-bank-year data to the firm-
year level and then match borrowers in Dealscan with firms in Compustat (Global & US).
For merging we use the file provided by Chava and Roberts (2008). Combining Dealscan
with Compustat reduces observations, since information for some firms, especially smaller
ones, are missing in Compustat. Overall, we are able to successfully match around 32 %
of our firm-year observations. We use information on firms’ syndicated loan volume,
investment, employment, total assets, sales and fixed assets, where we compute growth
rates as log differences.
To capture firms’ relationships with geographically diversified banks, we construct the
firm-level metric exposure. Intuitively, exposure measures whether firms borrow a lot or
little from diversified banks. Specifically, we weight firm f ’s outstanding loan volume by
each bank with the bank’s geographic diversification value (DIVb,t) in year t. Then, we
divide weighted loan volume by firm f ’s total outstanding loan volume in year t across
15In robustness checks, we use an alternative measure based on parent bank nationality.
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all banks:
exposuref,t =
∑B
b=1DIVb,t · loanf,b,t∑B
b=1 loanf,b,t
∈ [0,max(DIVb,t)], (2)
where B is the total number of banks with outstanding loans to firm f in year t. Similar
to diversification on the loan level, exposure = 0 implies that a firm borrows exclusively
from concentrated banks (DIV = 0 ∀ B). Higher values of exposure indicate stronger
relationships with diversified banks. An overview over all variables and their units of
measurement is provided in Table 17.
2.3 Descriptive Statistics
Figures 1 and 2 show the distribution of diversification on the loan level and exposure
on the firm level. About 8 % of all loans are extended by banks with no geographic
diversification. The remaining banks have at least some diversification, with a bunching
around 0.9. Figure 2 shows that more than 97 % of firms borrow from at least one
bank with non-zero geographic diversification. The median (mean) firm has 4 (8) bank
connections in a given year. This suggests that firms accessing the syndicated loan market
are potentially able to substitute across lenders during crises. The median (mean) number
of outstanding loans by banks per year is 2 (33).
[ Figures 1 and 2 about here ]
Our sample covers the years 1995 to 2012 and includes information on 35,510 firms
and 6,962 banks forming a total of 1,724,073 firm-bank-year observations, and 194,726
firm-year observations (9,393 firms and 60,953 observations for the matched Compustat
sample). There are a total of 2,046 banks with some diversification and 4,916 banks with
zero geographic diversification. The median (mean) value of diversification for banks with
non-zero diversification is 0.41 (0.40). The group of diversified banks extends around 93 %
of all loans, which reflects that they are large lenders. Table 1 highlights the geographical
distribution of loans, firms, and banks by region. The majority of loans are extended to
borrowers located in Europe, East Asia and Pacific, and North America. Moreover, coun-
tries in Europe and Asia have the highest number of geographically diversified banks.16
North American banks are less diversified as they lend mostly to borrowers located in the
16We split geographic diversification along the annual median and denote banks with an above median
value as diversified.
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U.S. or Canada. Finally, the highest incidence of banking crises occurs in Europe, Asia,
and, to a lesser extent, in Latin America.
Tables 2, 3, and 4 provide summary statistics of main variables. We split the respective
samples by diversification or exposure.17 For the syndicated loan market, Table 2 shows
that loans by geographically diversified banks are larger, have lower interest rates, and
are issued at longer maturity than loans by banks with geographically more concentrated
portfolios. The large difference in loan volume suggests that geographically diversified
banks are on average larger than their less diversified counterparts. In Table 3 the average
firm with an above median exposure to diversified banks obtains loans with larger volume,
lower interest rates and longer maturity compared to firms with fewer relationships with
diversified banks. Table 4 restricts the sample to firms with balance sheet information.
Borrowers with high exposure to diversified banks tend to grow slower and are larger than
their peers borrowing from banks with a geographically concentrated portfolio. Long-
term debt as share of total assets is similar across both groups indicating that they are
on average comparable in terms of their need for external finance. Overall, the difference
in firm characteristics highlights the need to control for loan demand.
[ Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4 about here ]
2.4 Empirical Strategy and Identification
To analyze lending behavior by geographically diversified banks and their effect on firms,
we use two aggregation levels. To isolate loan supply from loan demand, we begin on
the firm-bank-year level (loan level). Then, we aggregate the data to the firm-year level
(firm level) to examine substitution across loans, as well as real effects on firms.
Loan level: Our baseline specification tests how geographic diversification (DIV ) af-
fects loan volume for each firm-bank pair. To see whether diversification has a positive
effect on loan supply during financial turmoil in the borrower country, we interact diver-
sification with a banking crisis dummy (BC):
log(loan)f,b,t = β1 BCc,t + β2 DIVb,t−1 + β3 BCc,t ×DIVb,t−1 + φf,b + τt + εf,b,t. (3)
17Again, we split geographic diversification along the annual median and denote banks with an above
median value as diversified. Same goes for exposure.
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The dependent variable log(loan) denotes the log of outstanding loan volume of firm f
from bank b in year t. Banking crisis dummy BCc,t is at the country level and takes value
one during a crisis in firm country c in year t. DIVb,t−1 is the geographic diversification
index on the bank-year level. We lag DIV by one period to avoid contemporaneous effects
of the banking crisis on banks’ diversification.18 φf,b are firm
∗bank fixed effects, and τt
are either firm∗year or country∗industry∗year fixed effects. We cluster standard errors on
the firm-country∗year level to account for correlation within the same borrower country
across firms. Regression (3) is similar in spirit to a difference-in-difference regression.
The coefficient of interest β3 reflects the change in loan supply by diversified banks minus
the change in loan supply by concentrated banks. If diversified banks have better access
to funds during crises, their loan supply is higher compared to less diversified banks. This
is, we expect β3 > 0.
The key identification challenge is to absorb changes in loan demand to isolate loan
supply. Firms borrowing from diversified banks are on average bigger, so loan demand is
likely to be correlated with banks’ geographic diversification. Due to the granularity of
our data, we can overcome this issue. First, firm∗bank fixed effects exploit the variation
within the same firm-bank combination over time and control for unobservable and time-
invariant bank and firm heterogeneity (such as industry, location or average size), as
well as for unobservable time-invariant characteristics at the bank-firm level, such as
relationship or distance. Second, firm∗time fixed effects allow shocks to affect each firm
at each point in time heterogeneously. Thereby we control for unobservable time-varying
firm fundamentals (such as profitability, risk, and other balance sheet characteristics)
to identify credit supply.19 Essentially we are comparing the same firm borrowing from
different banks in a given year, while using only the within variation of each bank-firm
combination for estimation (Jime´nez, Mian, Peydro´ and Saurina, 2014a). After absorbing
any changes in loan demand our estimates reflect loan supply effects.
Firm level: On the loan level we observe whether credit at the firm-bank level changes
differentially during crises, depending on the type of lender. However, the analysis ne-
18We assume that a firm’s bank relationship can be proxied by its previous year credit dependence.
This builds on the finding of Ongena and Smith (2001) and Chodorow-Reich (2014) that banking rela-
tionships are sticky over time.
19For each firm-year pair, firm∗time fixed effects require observations from at least two banks. On
the syndicated loan market, around 97 % of all loans satisfy this condition. The sample selection effect
due to this demanding specification is therefore negligible.
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glects potential substitution effects and remains silent about the real effects of loan supply
on firms. If firms can easily substitute syndicated loans from banks that reduce loan sup-
ply with loans by banks that increase loan supply, the substitution offsets the credit
contraction of individual banks. In this case, firm exposure to geographically diversified
banks becomes irrelevant for firms’ syndicated loan growth. Beyond the syndicated loan
market, firms may also be able to substitute a fall in syndicated lending through other
debt instruments, for example non-syndicated credit or corporate bonds. Such a substi-
tution would imply that we do not find any effect of bank diversification on firms’ total
debt or investment, even if we find an effect on firms’ syndicated loan growth. Loan
supply only has real effects on firm performance if firms can at most partially substitute
the fall in credit.
To test for substitution and real effects, we run the following firm-level regression:
∆yf,t = γ1 BCc,t + γ2 exposuref,t−1 + γ3 BCc,t × exposuref,t−1 + φf + τc,i,t + uf,t, (4)
In the baseline specification, the dependent variable ∆yf,t is the log difference of outstand-
ing syndicated loan volume of firm f to all its lenders in year t. In further regressions, we
use the log difference of total long-term debt to test for substitution into non-syndicated
debt instruments. To analyze real effects, we also use investment and employment growth
in log differences. Banking crisis dummy (BCc,t) varies at the country-level and equals
one during banking crisis years in the firm country c. exposuref,t−1 is the share of firms
f ’s outstanding credit from diversified banks as defined in Equation (2), lagged by one
period. φf denote firm fixed effects, and τc,i,t denote time-varying country
∗industry∗year
fixed effects, where c and i denote firm f ’s country and industry. For our Compustat sam-
ple we additionally control for time-varying firm demand by including return on assets,
leverage, and log of assets. We cluster standard errors at the firm level in all estimations.
Our main coefficient of interest, γ3, is on the interaction term (BC× exposure). γ3 is
the firm level counterpart of β3, which is the estimated interaction coefficient (BC×DIV )
from loan level Equation (3). It shows the change in loan growth for high exposure firms
minus the change in loan growth for low exposure firms. If firms can perfectly substitute
a fall in lending by one bank with other forms of financing, then γ3 = 0 in the respective
regression. In turn, a non-zero estimate of γ3 suggests imperfect substitution. We expect
γ3 > 0, as higher exposure to diversified banks should lead to higher loan growth during
crises.
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To identify loan supply, we employ country∗industry∗time fixed effects to absorb time-
varying demand changes for each industry in each country. The identifying assumption is
that all firms within one industry of one country change their loan demand equally. How
reasonable is it to assume no heterogeneity in firm demand within industries? If there is
differential loan demand within industries, our coefficient is biased and does not reflect
supply effects. We test the validity of this identifying assumption on the loan-level, where
we compare estimates using country∗industry∗time fixed effects with estimates employing
the more rigorous firm∗time fixed effects.20 As we will show, coefficient are close, but
somewhat larger under country∗industry∗time fixed effects, so we interpret our firm-level
estimates as upper bounds of the true effect.
3 Results
In Section 3.1 we first establish on the loan level that diversified banks smooth local finan-
cial shocks, relative to non-diversified banks. Time-varying borrower-fixed effects control
for changes in firm demand to isolate supply effects. To examine real effects, we then
aggregate to the firm level and show that firms with higher exposure to diversified banks
have stronger loan, investment, and employment growth during banking crises. Section
3.2 sheds light on the underlying mechanism and shows that geographic diversification
improves banks’ access to funding.
Before moving to the regression analysis, Figure 3 shows the stabilizing effect of
diversified banks in a non-parametric way. Panel 3a plots log loan volume in the four
years prior, during, and after a banking crisis. We split loans into loans by diversified
(blue solid line) and non-diversified (dashed black line) banks according to the yearly
median of diversification. Loan volume follows a similar trend for diversified and non-
diversified banks in the years preceding a crisis. However, it diverges sharply during the
crisis. Both types of banks see a sharp and persistent contraction in loan volume, but the
decline is almost twice as strong for non-diversified banks. The divergence in loan volume
is because of banks’ portfolio diversification and we will estimate it as the difference in the
change in loan supply by diversified banks and the change in loan supply by concentrated
banks (coefficient β3 in regression (3)). We now confirm that the pattern shown in Figure
20Our baseline sample requires each country-industry-year pair to have at least two firms. When
we use firm∗time fixed effects, we lose around 2 % of observations, as some firms only have one lender
connection.
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3 holds in regression analysis.
3.1 Main Results
Loan level: Table 6 reports results for regression Equation (3) and shows that diversi-
fied banks maintain higher loan growth during banking crises, relative to non-diversified
banks. The dependent variable is log loan volume. Column (1) looks at variation within
each firm-bank connection by using fixed effects on the firm∗bank level. Diversified banks
extend loans with higher volume in general, as indicated by the positive coefficient on
diversification. The coefficient of interest (β3) on the interaction term (DIV × BC) is
highly significant and positive. During banking crises, increasing diversification by one
standard deviation increases loan volume by (0.31× 0.135 =) 4.2 %. To ensure that the
positive effect is due to supply effects, column (2) adds firm∗time fixed effects to absorb
any time-varying changes in firm demand.21 Borrowing from a diversified bank is now not
statistically different to borrowing from a non-diversified bank during non-crisis times.
The positive effect of diversified banks during banking crises remains significant: increas-
ing diversification by one standard deviation during a banking crisis increases firms’ loan
volume by 1.2 %. Borrowing from a fully diversified bank (DIV = 1) increases the pos-
itive effect to 3.9 %, compared to borrowing from banks with an entirely concentrated
portfolio (DIV = 0). Comparing columns (1) and (2), we see that absorbing demand ef-
fects reduces the coefficient on the interaction term by around two-thirds. The change in
size suggests that diversified banks lend to borrowers of higher resilience and better qual-
ity during crises.22 However, after controlling for loan demand, there remains a positive
and significant loan supply effect associated with higher geographic diversification.
Figure 3, Panel 3b plots log loan volume after removing loan demand effects through
firm∗time fixed effects.23 Comparing it to Panel 3a, we see that demand effects explain
a large part of the overall decline in loan volume. Strikingly, after removing demand
effects, diversified banks maintain their loan supply during the crisis and increase it in
the following years. Non-diversified banks reduce loan volume persistently. The increase
21The coefficient on banking crisis is now absorbed by firm∗year fixed effects.
22In Section 3.2 we show that firms with higher exposure to diversified banks are less risky and have
lower volatility in terms of sales and asset growth.
23We plot the residual of a regression of log(loan volume) on firm∗time fixed effects that absorb any
unobservable change in firms’ loan demand. After absorbing demand effects the residual reflects banks’
credit supply.
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in loans by diversified banks suggests that there is substitution in lending across banks −
a notion we will confirm in Section 5. As in Panel 3a, loan supply follows a similar trend
for both bank types prior to the crisis. By absorbing any changes in firms’ loan demand,
Panel 3b provides a clean identification of the stabilizing effect of portfolio diversification
on loan supply.
When we move to the firm level, we can no longer control for credit demand through
firm∗time fixed effects. Instead, we use country∗industry∗year fixed effects, so we assume
that firms within the same country-industry-year pair change demand similarly. To ver-
ify this assumption, column (3) runs the loan level regression with country∗industry∗year
fixed effects. Comparing coefficients with column (2) indicates how appropriate we cap-
ture demand effects. The coefficient of interest has the same sign and significance, but is
larger in column (3). Controlling for time-varying industry demand leads to an overes-
timation of the effect by about one third. The increase in the coefficient on DIV × BC
suggests that even within four-digit industries, there is variation in loan demand.24 We
therefore interpret our firm level results as an upper bound of the true effect.
To further support our identifying assumption, we repeat the exercise carried out in
columns (1)−(3) on a smaller sample of firms that borrowed from both concentrated and
diversified banks (Khwaja and Mian, 2008). This specification alleviates concerns about
firms self-selecting into bank relationships. If the best firms pair only with diversified
banks, selection effects bias our results. By focusing on firms that borrowed from both
diversified and non-diversified banks in each year, we circumvent this potential pitfall.
Columns (4)−(6) repeat the exercise carried out in columns (1)-(3) on the restricted
sample. In all specifications we find a significant positive effect of diversification during
banking crises. The magnitude is similar to columns (1)-(3), which is evidence that
results are robust to self-selection. However, note that the change in coefficient β3 from
column (5) to (6) is around 20 % and smaller than from (2) to (3). This is in line with
expectations, as the sample is selected on the theoretical argument that firms borrowing
from diversified and non-diversified banks simultaneously behave similar towards both
bank types. All in all results in Table 6 show that diversified banks sustain higher loan
supply during crisis times, relative to banks with a concentrated loan portfolio.
[ Table 6 about here ]
24Note that the standard deviation of diversification is 0.089 for each firm-year pair, but 0.072 for
each country-industry-year pair. Adjusting for the difference in variation reduces the difference between
both columns to about 20 %.
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Firm level: Loan-level regressions identify changes in individual firm-bank connections.
If firms can substitute between bank types during banking crises, changes in individual
loans need not affect firms. Suppose a firm borrowing from a non-diversified bank sees a
contraction in loan supply. Forming a new borrowing relationship with a diversified bank
mitigates the negative credit supply shock. To examine whether credit supply shocks
have real effects, we aggregate to the firm-year level. Tables 7 and 8 show results for
estimating regression Equation (4). Firms with higher exposure to diversified banks fare
better during banking crises, relative to firms with low exposure.
[ Tables 7 and 8 about here ]
In Table 7, column (1) controls for unobservable time-invariant firm characteristics through
firm fixed effects. The dependent variable is loan growth ∆loanf,b,t. In line with expecta-
tions, the coefficient on exposure is negative, because diversified banks lend predominately
to larger firms in developed economies, which have lower average growth rates. The nega-
tive coefficient on banking crisis implies that borrowers’ credit growth declines by 14.2 %
during banking crises when they have no connections to diversified banks (exposure= 0).
Higher exposure to diversified banks attenuates the negative effect. The coefficient on
the interaction term of exposure and banking crisis (exposure×BC) is positive and sta-
tistically significant at the 1 % level. Increasing exposure from the 25th to 75th percentile
increases loan growth during a crisis by (0.39× 0.055 =) 2.1 %. To remove time-varying
demand shocks, column (2) absorbs shocks on the country∗year level, column (3) on the
more granular country∗industry∗year level.25 In both specifications, coefficients are of
similar sign, magnitude, and significance. In our preferred specification in column (3),
moving a firm from the 25th to 75th percentile in terms of exposure to diversified banks
leads to 1.5 % higher loan growth. Average loan growth equals 3.6 %, so the positive
effect of borrowing from diversified banks is sizeable. The effect on the firm level is similar
in size to effects on the loan level. This suggests that frictions hamper firms from switch-
ing across bank types during recessions, a common finding in the literature (Ongena and
Smith, 2001; Chodorow-Reich, 2014).
In Table 8 we restrict our sample to firms for which we have balance sheet informa-
tion. To analyze real effects, we use long-term debt, employment, and investment as
dependent variables (all in log differences). For each dependent variable, we run a par-
simonious specification with firm fixed effects, as well as one enriched with time-varying
25As banking crisis does not vary on the industry level, the coefficient is absorbed by fixed effects.
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firm controls and time-varying fixed effects at the country∗year level.26 We consistently
find that firms borrowing from diversified banks have significantly higher growth rates
during crises. In the more stringent specification, moving borrowers from the 25th to
75th percentile in terms of exposure to diversified banks leads to higher long-term debt
(4.1 %, column (2)), employment (1.1 %, column (4)), and investment growth (4.6 %,
column (6)) during crises. Similar to loan growth in Table 7, growth rates are lower for
high-exposure borrowers in normal times and fall during banking crises. This reflects that
diversified banks lend to larger firms that have lower average growth rates (see Table 4).
Controlling for common time-varying shocks on the country level as well as time-varying
firm controls in general reduces the magnitude and significance of the effect.
Our loan- and firm-level findings show that firms can at most imperfectly substitute
declines in syndicated lending by other forms of funding. Credit supply by diversified
banks leads to real effects for firms. Results from Table 7 suggest that firms cannot
switch from concentrated to diversified banks in the syndicated loan market. Otherwise,
exposure in previous periods would not affect loan growth. The positive effects of exposure
in Table 8 on long-term debt, as well as investment and employment, additionally indicate
that firms cannot substitute from syndicated into non-syndicated lending. In sum, Tables
6−8 establish that changes on the syndicated loan market have real economic effects,
which cannot be undone through other forms of credit. Borrowing from diversified banks
significantly increases firms’ loan growth during times of financial distress. In other
words, diversified banks stabilize loan supply and smooth local financial shocks. In the
following sections, we provide evidence that banks’ diversification and internal capital
markets explain our results.
3.2 Mechanism
Recent studies argue that diversified banks have better access to funding during times
of financial distress and use their internal capital market to distribute resources among
affiliates to smooth local shocks.27 So far, our results do not tell us whether banks
reallocate existing funds across affiliates, or raise new funds to sustain credit supply. The
26Unfortunately, the low number of observations per industry leads to a large loss of observations
when we use country∗industry∗year fixed effects.
27See for example Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2004); Goldberg (2009); Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012);
Buch and Goldberg (2014); Bord, Ivashina and Taliaferro (2015); Coleman, Correa, Feler and Goldrosen
(2017); Corte´s and Strahan (2017); Levine, Lin and Xie (2017).
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answer to the question has important implications, as the former implies spillover effects
to unaffected markets, while the latter does not. Suppose there is a negative financial
shock in Germany. Will a bank that is active in Germany and France move funds from
France to Germany and reduce lending in France to prop up German affiliates? Or can it
raise new funds, which allows it to stabilize lending in Germany while maintaining loan
supply in France?
If diversification improves banks’ access to funds in times of distress, it relaxes their
‘financial constraints’. The additional funds could be raised in the crisis country, but
also in unaffected borrower markets and transferred via the intra-bank capital market.
‘Constrained’ non-diversified banks cannot raise new funds when they face a negative
shock. Instead, they must trade off where to allocate existing liquidity within their bank
network. Any reallocation of funds towards crisis countries will then lead to negative
spillover effects to borrower markets that are connected to the bank. By analyzing changes
in loan supply in connected countries, we thus can provide indirect evidence on banks’
internal capital markets.
To answer the question we aggregate to the bank-borrower country-year level and
define the variable connected. For each bank-country-year triplet, connected equals one
for all non-crisis countries k ( 6= j) in year t if country j has a crisis (where k and j sum
up to all borrower countries from bank b in year t).28 In the spirit of Giroud and Mueller
(2015, 2017) the coefficient on connected shows how loan growth changes in all connected
countries that borrow from bank b, but do not experience a crisis. We run regressions of
the following form:
∆loanb,j,t = φb,j + τt + ρ1 BCj,t + ρ2 connectedb,k,t + ρ3 DIVb,t−1
+ ρ4 DIVb,t−1 ×BCj,t + ρ5 DIVb,t−1 × connectedb,k,t + ub,j,t,
(5)
where the dependent variable is loan growth by bank b to all borrowers in j at t in log
differences. DIV is our diversification metric on the bank level. We use bank-borrower
country (φb,j) and time (τt) fixed effects to analyze changes within a bank-borrower
country connection and absorb common trends. We expect banking crises to affect loan
growth negatively, so ρ1 < 0. If there are spillover effects, connected markets see a fall
in loan growth and ρ2 < 0. From our previous results, we expect that diversified banks
stabilize loan growth in host country j, so ρ4 > 0. If diversified banks are financially
28For example, for a bank that lends to Germany, France, and Italy, where Germany experiences a
crisis in 2005, connected takes on value one for France and Italy in 2005 and zero otherwise.
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unconstrained, they mitigate spillover effects and the coefficient on the interaction term
(DIV × connected) is positive (ρ5 > 0). In other words, if ρ5 > 0 we conclude that
diversified banks have better access to financing during host market shocks and transfer
resources through their intra-bank capital market. We cluster at the bank level to account
for serial and cross-sectional dependence across borrowers from the same bank. In all
regressions, we include borrower-country macroeconomic controls trade (in % of GDP),
inflation rate, log GDP per capita, and log population.
Table 9 shows that globally diversified banks have higher loan growth in crisis coun-
tries, and shield connected countries from spillovers. Column (1) shows that during
banking crises, and in line with our previous findings, countrywide loan growth drops
significantly by 3.0 %. Column (2) confirms for the aggregate level that diversified banks
are stabilizing, relative to banks with a concentrated portfolio. Similar to findings on
the loan and firm level, the coefficient on diversification, interacted with banking crisis,
is significant and positive. For banks with zero diversification, loan growth falls by 5.4
% during banking crises. Increasing diversification from the 25th to the 75th percentile
attenuates the effect by (0.63 × 0.164 =) 4.1 %. Note that the highly significant coeffi-
cient on DIV × BC is equal in magnitude to the negative coefficient on banking crisis.
This implies that banks with a fully diversified portfolio are able to completely offset the
negative effect of a banking crisis on countrywide loan growth.
In column (3) we introduce our new variable connected. The negative and significant
coefficient on connected implies that banks reduce lending by 2.9 % in unaffected countries
when another borrowing country experiences a banking crisis. Note that the spillover
effect is about two-thirds the size of the coefficient on banking crisis. Column (4) adds
interaction terms. The positive and highly significant coefficients on DIV × BC and
DIV × connected show that diversified banks stabilize loan supply in their host country,
and reduce contagion effects. Moving a bank from the 25th to the 75th percentile reduces
spillover effects from −6.3 % to zero. Fully diversified banks are thus able to offset the
crisis-induced decline in loan supply both in affected and connected countries.
[ Table 9 about here ]
We interpret our results as evidence that being geographically diversified allows banks
to tap new funds during crises, which reduces the need to withdraw capital from other
markets. The ability to raise new deposits stabilizes banks’ loan growth in the crisis
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country, but also shields connected markets from negative spillovers. This finding is in
line with recent literature. Levine, Lin and Xie (2017) show that diversified banks have
lower risk in their portfolio, which allows them to access cheaper funding during times
of distress. Complementary, Corte´s and Strahan (2017) find that banks use internal
capital markets to reallocate funds towards regions with high loan demand. Similar to
our findings, the reallocation has negative effects on connected areas for smaller and
less diversified banks that cannot raise new funds. Bord, Ivashina and Taliaferro (2015)
provide additional evidence that large and healthy banks raise new deposits to smooth
shocks and shield connected markets from spillovers.
So far, our analysis focuses on the asset side of banks’ balance sheets. We will now
present direct evidence on the liability side to test the relationship between diversification
and access to funding for a subsample of US banks. We merge 334 of our Dealscan banks
with bank data provided by the FDIC’s Statistics on Depository Institutions (SDI). For
US banks, we obtain quarterly information on deposits, assets, return on assets, net
interest margins, as well as Tier 1 capital, which results in a total of 6,446 bank-quarter
observations.29 To see whether host country (non-US) shocks lead to an increase in
deposits for diversified banks, we regress banks’ log deposits on its diversification metric
(DIV ), interacted with the share of syndicated loans extended to crisis countries (loans
in crisis). We control for size, Tier 1 capital ratio, return on assets, and net interest
margin, as well as bank and quarter fixed effects. If diversified banks can tap new funds
during times of distress, we expect a positive effect of diversification on US deposits.
Table 10 shows that diversified banks increase their deposits in response to a host
country shock. Column (1) shows that for the average bank, deposits fall when it has a
higher share of loans in distress. This could reflect that depositors question liquidity or
solvency of the bank when parts of its loans are in distress. Once we add our interaction
terms and controls in columns (2) and (3), we find that diversified banks increase their
deposits during crises in borrower countries. Increasing diversification by one standard
deviation leads to an increase in deposits of around 0.5 % (evaluated at the mean of
share of loans in crisis). Thus, diversified banks raise new funds in their home market
when faced with a shock in their host country. When we look at different types of
29Dealscan and FDIC classify banks’ parents by different criteria. With this caveat in mind, we
match on subsidiary names, but assign each bank its parent’s diversification value from Dealscan. SDI
in general cover FDIC-insured depository institutions, which constitute most of the U.S. retail banking
market. This leads to sample selection, as several banks in the syndicated loan market are not FDIC-
insured.
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deposits in columns (4)-(6), we see that the effect is driven by demand and money market
deposits. Both types of deposits are short term and readily available, so it is reasonable
to assume that banks cover their immediate needs following a crisis by raising short-term
funding. There is no effect on time deposits (column (4)). While the sample covers only
a limited number of US banks and has limited external validity, the strong positive effect
of diversification on deposit growth supports our hypothesis that diversified banks can
raise new funds during times of distress.30
[ Table 10 about here ]
4 Robustness
We argue that banks’ geographic diversification is the reason that they stabilize loan sup-
ply. In this section we address potential alternative explanations. To ensure identification
of supply effects, we run variants of loan-level regression Equation (3). In all regressions,
firm∗bank and firm∗time fixed effects absorb credit demand.
Foreign banks Diversified banks lend a significant share of their loans to foreign mar-
kets. A large literature finds that foreign and domestic banks differ during crisis episodes,
which raises the concern that our classification by portfolio allocation simply reflects
banks’ nationality.31 Table 11 shows that a categorization of banks by diversification is
different from a categorization by nationality. We include a foreign bank dummy that
takes on value 1 if a banks’ home country is not equal to its host country.32 Column (1)
shows that foreign banks reduce lending by 1.6 % during host banking crises. Once we in-
clude our diversification metric in column (2), a non-diversified foreign bank reduces loan
supply by 4.4 %. Diversified banks, on the other hand, are still stabilizing. Compared
to baseline results in Table 6, the coefficient on DIV ×BC increases in size to 8 % once
we control for banks’ nationality. This suggests that domestic banks with a diversified
portfolio are the most stabilizing source of funding. We confirm this suspicion in column
30Note that in columns (5)-(6) the coefficient on share of loans in crisis is negative. For concentrated
banks, deposits fall in the US during host country shocks. A possible explanation is that they have to
transfer existing funds to their affiliates in affected areas.
31For a recent summary, see Claessens (2017).
32As nationality is constant within firm-bank connections, the coefficient on foreign bank is absorbed
by fixed effects.
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(3), where we interact the foreign dummy with diversification. For ease of interpretation
we redefine diversification as a dummy with value one if diversification is above the yearly
median. The interaction effect between diversification and foreign bank during banking
crisis is highly significant and negative. The coefficients on interaction terms DIV ×BC
(foreign bank×BC) remain positive (negative) and significant at the 1 % (5 %) level. In
terms of economic significance, effects differ extensively across bank types. During bank-
ing crises, non-diversified foreign banks reduce lending by 1.9 %. Domestic diversified
banks increase their relative loan supply by 8.2 %. The intermediate group of diversified
foreign banks increases loan supply by 2.4 %. Results in columns (1)-(3) confirm the
following pecking order: diversified domestic banks (DIV = 1, foreign bank = 0) are the
most stable source of funding, while foreign banks with little diversification (DIV = 0,
foreign bank = 1) are the most fickle. Foreign diversified banks lie in the middle. The
ordering ties with findings on the flight home effect (Giannetti and Laeven, 2012) and
behavior of gross capital flows during crises (Broner, Didier, Erce and Schmukler, 2013).
International loan portfolio The fact that banks extend international loans could
itself reflect a different business model, regardless of diversification, and be responsible for
our main findings. To take into account the international allocation of banks’ loan portfo-
lio, analogous to our diversification metric in Equation (1) we define banks’ international
portfolio as the ratio of international loans to total loans:
INTb,t =
intl. syndicated loan volumeb,t
total syndicated loan volumeb,t
∈ [0, 1]. (6)
Intl. syndicated loan volumeb,t is the sum of all loans by bank b in year t to firms located
in a different country than the bank’s parent entity. Total syndicated loan volumeb,t is
total lending in year t to all firms, domestic and foreign. We call banks with a low
value of INT ‘national’, those with a high value ‘international’. Figure 4 plots both
metrics against each other, where international portfolio (INT) is on the x-axis, and banks’
geographic diversification (DIV) on the y-axis (the blue line represents the quadratic fit).
The humped shaped relationship that fans out for higher values of INT reflects the
conceptual differences underlying each metric: banks that only lend domestically are in
the bottom left corner (local on both metrics). Banks that lend exclusively to one foreign
country are in the bottom right corner. They are globally integrated by our second
definition (INT), but concentrated by our first (DIV), as they lend internationally but
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are not diversified.33 The dispersion in diversification for a given level of ‘internationality’
indicates that banks lending internationally differ widely in the geographic allocation of
their portfolio − being international does not automatically imply diversification. That
being said, the correlation between both metrics is high (0.81).
[ Figure 4 about here ]
Columns (4)-(7) in Table 11 show that diversification, not internationality, leads to posi-
tive loan supply effects. Column (4) shows that banks with a fully international portfolio
stabilize loan growth by 2.3 %, significant at the 5 % level. However, once we include
diversification in column (5), the positive effect disappears and turns negative, albeit
insignificant. The positive stabilizing role of diversified banks remains. When we interact
both metrics in columns (6) and (7), the following picture emerges. During banking crises,
banks with international loans are stabilizing only if they have a diversified portfolio (pos-
itive coefficients on DIV × INT and DIV × INT × BC). Banks with a concentrated,
but international, portfolio have a significant negative impact on loan supply (coefficient
of −0.084 on INT × BC in column (7)). We conclude that diversification, not banks’
nationality, or whether they lend to foreign borrowers, explains the positive effects on
loan supply during host country banking crises.
[ Table 11 about here ]
Share of loans in crisis An alternative explanation for our results is that diversified
banks extend a smaller share of their total loan portfolio to countries in crisis. Once a
banking crisis hits a borrower country, the asset side of a more diversified bank is less
exposed to adverse effects such as loan write-downs. To test whether asset diversification
is driving results we define for each bank share of loans in crisis as the share of total
loans in year t that are extended to all borrower countries in crisis.34 Diversified and
concentrated banks have a similar average share of loans in crisis (32 %), but diversified
banks’ median share of loans in crisis is significantly higher (6.5 % to 1%). In Table
12, column (1), we control for the share of loans in crisis, as well as its interaction
33The lower bound of the arch reflects the minimum level of diversification for each bank, given that
it lends to more than one country. The upper bound, in turn, shows banks that lend to more than one
country, but have a diversified (read: not geographically concentrated) portfolio.
34For each bank b in year t, we define share of loans in crisist,b =
∑
c BCt,cLt,b,c∑
c Lt,b,c
, where c denotes all
countries borrowing from bank b in year t.
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with banking crisis. Our main coefficient of interest increases compared to our baseline
loan-level regression (from 0.039 to 0.054). Hence the positive effect of diversification
is not driven by the share of loans in crisis. For a given share of loans in distress,
better diversification leads to higher loan supply. Once we introduce a triple interaction
term in column (2), we see that a higher share of loans in crisis reduces loan volume
for banks with no diversification. Instead, for a given share of loans in crisis countries,
diversified banks stabilize loan volume, as indicated by the significant positive coefficient
of DIV × share of loans×BC. The negative, but insignificant coefficient on DIV × BC
could suggest that banks reduce lending to countries where they only hold a small share
of loans. Diversification becomes more important for loan supply when a high share of
loans is in distress.
[ Table 12 about here ]
Portfolio risk Banks differ in terms of borrower risk (Neuhann and Saidi, 2016; Levine,
Lin and Xie, 2017). If diversified banks extend loans to less risky borrowers, they are less
exposed to the negative effects of a crisis. To address this issue, for each bank we compute
portfolio risk by taking the standard deviation of sales growth for each firm in non-crisis
years. We consider non-crisis years only, as the stabilizing role of diversified banks during
crises could lead to a downward bias in measured volatility. Table 5 shows that firms
with low exposure to diversified banks are riskier in terms of volatility of investment,
employment, asset, and sales growth. Firms are assigned into top and bottom tercile
according to their exposure for each year.35 In Table 12, column (3), we ensure that
our baseline finding survives for the smaller sample of loans to borrowers with balance
sheet information. Diversified banks still have significantly higher loan supply. Once we
include portfolio risk (interacted with banking crisis) in column (4), we see that higher
portfolio risk reduces loan supply during a banking crisis.36 However, the main coefficient
of interest on DIV × BC increases. Including a triple interaction effect in column (5)
keeps the main coefficient stable. We also see that higher portfolio risk reduces loan
supply for non-diversified banks. The positive triple interaction term indicates that for
a given level of portfolio risk, better diversification leads to higher loan supply during
crisis. We interpret this as evidence that portfolio risk is not responsible for the stabilizing
35 We restrict the analysis to observations for which we have balance sheet data, which reduces the
number of loan-level observations by around 60 %.
36Portfolio risk is constant for banks and thus absorbed by fixed effects.
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effect we find, but that banks’ diversification still leads to significantly higher loan supply
during crises − in the presence of portfolio risk, the positive effect of diversification gains
in importance.
[ Table 5 about here ]
Bank size Table 12, column (6) controls for bank size. As we have no direct data on
bank size for the full sample, we assume that bigger banks grant larger loans and use
loan size as proxy. To ensure that diversification has a positive effect on loan supply
above and beyond banks’ size, for each year we create quintiles by total loan volume. We
then include size-quintile∗year fixed effects in our regression. We thus compare lending
between each bank-firm pair within a given size class of banks in each year. We also
include firm∗time fixed effects to absorb any change in loan demand. The positive and
significant effect of diversification on loan supply survives once we control for banks’ size.
After including size∗year fixed effects, during a banking crisis fully diversified banks have
3.7 % higher loan volume compared to non-diversified banks within the same size-year
bin.
5 Extensions
This section presents extensions and further robustness checks of our baseline findings.
We show that our diversification metric correlates with macro variables of financial in-
tegration; effects are stronger for financially constrained firms; diversified banks extend
loans at longer maturity, but higher interest during crises; and that, following a crisis,
there is a shift in firms’ portfolios towards lending by diversified banks.
Macro evidence We use syndicated loan market data to construct our bank diversifi-
cation metric. Syndicated lending represents a sizable share of firm debt and cross-border
loans (Gadanecz and von Kleist, 2002). We now show that our metric (aggregated to the
country level) correlates with aggregate country-level variables. Figure 5, Panel a) shows
a strong positive relationship between borrowing countries’ total syndicated lending (as
share of GDP) against total credit (as share of GDP). Countries with a high level of
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overall credit also have a high level of syndicated loan volume.37 Panels b)−d) show the
relationship between our diversification metric and aggregate measures of banking inte-
gration. Diversification is positively correlated with the share of foreign bank assets (as
share of total bank assets), claims by foreign banks, as well as foreign liabilities (both as
share of GDP).38 Hence, countries with a high share of firms borrowing from diversified
banks are also better financially integrated. They have higher foreign bank presence in
their domestic market, as well as larger claims on foreign countries. Taken together, this
implies that syndicated lending in our data is positively correlated with total credit, and
our diversification metric captures financial integration.
[ Figure 5 about here ]
Financial constraints We split firms into financially constrained and unconstrained.
As constrained firms rely more on external credit to finance employment and investment,
higher exposure to diversified banks should have stronger effects. For each year we group
firms into bottom and top tercile according to their payout ratio (payout) and size (size).
We classify firms as financially constrained if they are in the bottom tercile, and uncon-
strained if they are in the top tercile (Almeida and Campello, 2007; Chaney, Sraer and
Thesmar, 2012). In Table 13, columns (1)-(4) use employment growth as dependent vari-
able, columns (5)-(8) investment growth. All regressions include baseline controls, as well
as firm and country∗year fixed effects. For both dependent variables, the positive effect of
exposure to diversified banks during crises is significantly stronger for constrained (cons.)
than unconstrained (uncons.) firms. Note that our Compustat sample covers large and
listed firms. The stronger effects for financially constrained firms reassure us that effects
would extend to a sample covering small firms as well. In general, small firms are found
to be more bank dependent and also more credit constrained and therefore loan supply
decisions matter more.
Maturity and interest rates Beside changes in loan amount, banks can alter ma-
turity or the interest rate of loans. To test whether banks use these margins to restrict
or expand loan supply, we rerun firm level regression Equation (4), but replace the de-
37A regression of total credit on syndicated credit with country fixed effects yields a coefficient of 0.29
with t-value 11.47.
38Data is provided by the Bank for International Settlements, the World Bank World Development
Indicators, as well as Global Financial Development Database. See Table 17 for details.
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pendent variable by maturity (in months), and interest spread over LIBOR (in basis
points). Table 14 shows that borrowing from diversified banks leads to a higher spread
and longer maturity during crises. While the effect on maturity is quantitatively negligi-
ble and insignificant, a one standard deviation increase in exposure increases the spread
by around 7 basis points. We interpret this as evidence that diversified banks are willing
to extend loans during crises, but compensate higher risk through higher interest rates.
Columns (3)-(5) further examine the robustness of our results. The dependent variable
is loan growth. Column (3) excludes the global crisis and restricts the sample to years
1995−2008. Column (4) introduces a global financial crisis (GFC) dummy with value one
during banking crises in years 2008, 2009, and 2010. In both columns, our main effect
remains positive and significant. The recent financial crisis does not drive our results.
Finally, column (5) introduces a regional crisis dummy.39 The negative coefficient on
exposure × regional BC suggests that during crises affecting several countries at once,
the positive effect of diversification is weakened. Yet, our baseline effect remains stable.
[ Tables 13 and 14 about here ]
Substitution effects While we showed above that diversified banks sustain higher
loan supply and credit growth to firms during crises, we now investigate how the differing
behavior of diversified and concentrated banks changes the structure of the economy.
First, we look at substitution effects on the firm level. While firms cannot perfectly offset
changes in loan supply by switching across banks, Table 15 shows that there is nonetheless
an increase in reliance on diversified lenders. We run a regression of firms’ exposure (i.e.
the share of loans coming from diversified banks) on the banking crisis dummy. Columns
(1)-(4) use firm and region∗year fixed effects, and look at within firm changes, while
controlling for common regional shocks. All regressions include firm-country controls
trade, inflation, log GDP per capita, and log population. There is a significant and
positive effect of banking crisis on firms’ exposure. The average firm sees an increase
in its exposure to diversified lenders by 0.7 % during the year of the crisis. Effects are
highly persistent even three years after the crisis. Besides a shift in exposure within firms,
there could also be a shift across firms towards firms that borrow more from diversified
banks. Columns (5)-(8) use country∗industry instead of firm fixed effects and compare
39The regional BC dummy takes on value one for Asian countries during the Asian crisis (1997-1999),
South American countries during the Latin crisis (1995-1996), as well as the Great Financial Crisis in
Europe and the US.
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how exposure changes across firms within a given country-industry pair. Results show
that during a banking crisis there is a shift towards borrowers from diversified banks.
The share of loans from diversified banks increases by 0.3 % in the year of the crisis. It
is still 1.1 % higher three years after the crisis. The stronger effect on the industry level
suggests that on top of a shift towards diversified lenders within firms, there is also a
shift within industries across firms towards borrowers with higher exposure.
[ Tables 15 and 16 about here ]
The increase in firms’ reliance on diversified banks should be mirrored in banks’ loan
portfolios. We run the following regression on the bank (b) − borrower country (j) −
year (t) level:
shareb,j,t = γ1BCj,t + γ2diversificationb,t + γ3DIVb,t ×BCj,t +Xj,t + b,j,t.
shareb,j,t denotes bank b’s share of total loans in country j in year t and X is a set of
controls for the borrower country. Based on our above findings, we expect that a banking
crisis leads to a decline in share (γ1 < 0), but the decline should be smaller or absent for
diversified banks (γ3 > 0), as they are a more stable source of funding. The coefficient
γ2 on DIV is expected to be negative, as diversified banks will have a lower average
loan share than concentrated banks. In each regression, we use bank∗borrower country
fixed effects and analyze variation in loan shares within a specific bank-borrower country
connection. We also employ time-varying fixed effects on the bank country level to
absorb changes in each banks’ home country. If, for example, there is a contemporaneous
negative shock in a banks’ home country that we do not account for, the stabilizing effect
of diversification is likely to be muted. Again, all regressions include borrower-country
controls trade, inflation, log GDP per capita, and log population.
Table 16, column (1), shows that a banking crisis in host country j reduces banks’
share of loans extended to j by 0.7 %. The effect is significant at the 1 % level and
economically meaningful. The median loan share is 2.2 %, so a banking crisis reduces
banks’ loan share by around 31 % relative to the median. Once we interact our crisis
dummy with our diversification metric in column (2), we see that i) in non-crisis times,
diversified banks have a lower loan share in host countries than concentrated banks; and
ii) their share falls by less during banking crises. Columns (2)-(5) lead the dependent
variable by subsequent periods. In each specification we find that diversified banks reduce
their loan share by less. For example, in column (2), fully diversified banks reduce their
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loan share by 0 %, compared to 1.3 % for banks with no diversification. Combining
our evidence in Tables 15 and 16, we find that banking crises in host countries increase
borrowers’ reliance on lending by diversified banks. The long-run effects of the increase
in importance of diversified banks on financial stability and, for example, spillover effects,
is an interesting question for future research.
6 Conclusion
We develop a novel metric to categorize banks according to the geographic diversification
of their international loan portfolio. For a large sample of international syndicated loans,
we find that diversified banks are a resilient source of financing for firms that experience a
countrywide financial crisis. Borrowing from diversified banks increases loan, investment,
and employment growth significantly. Detailed loan-level data ensures proper identifica-
tion of supply effects, as we absorb changes in firm demand through time-varying fixed
effects on the firm level. Our results provide evidence that diversification allows banks
to raise new funds during times of distress, which are then allocated towards affiliates
in distress. This not only stabilizes loan supply in affected countries, but also reduces
spillover effects to connected markets.
When we contrast our measure with the standard classification by nationality, we
find that domestic, diversified banks are the most resilient source of financing, while
foreign banks provide no insurance. The negative effect of foreign banks is increasing
in the concentration of their portfolio. We also exclude candidate explanations other
than diversification. Geographic diversification remains a significant factor contributing
to higher stability in lending even after we control for banks’ international orientation,
share of loans in crisis, and portfolio risk.
This paper contributes to the debate on the costs and benefits of financial integration.
Figure 6 shows that banks’ diversification declined during the global financial crisis and
remained depressed thereafter. Our results suggest that the recent retrenchment in fi-
nancial integration following the Great Financial Crisis is worrisome (Milesi-Ferretti and
Tille, 2011; Cerutti and Claessens, 2016; Claessens and Van Horen, 2015). While cross-
border lending constitutes a potential source of contagion, we show that internationally
active and diversified banks have better access to funds during banking crises in their
borrower countries and increase resilience to local shocks.
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A Appendix
A.1 Descriptives
Figure 1: Diversification − loan level
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Figure 2: Exposure − firm level
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Note: Figure 1 shows the loan-level distribution of banks’ diversification, Figure 2 the firm-level distribution of firms’
exposure. The mass of observations shifts from the right tail towards the middle, indicating that most firms borrow from
both diversified and concentrated banks in each year. For detailed variable definitions see Table 17 and text.
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Figure 3: Loan volume during a crisis
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Note: Both panels show the evolution of log(loan volume) in the four years prior, during, and the four years after a banking
crisis. A value of 0 on the x-axis denotes the year of the banking crisis. We split the sample by the yearly median for banks
with high and low values of diversification. Panel 3a shows the unconditional average across all banks. Both diversified and
concentrated banks see a decline in outstanding loan volume during the crisis and the following years, but concentrated
banks see a stronger fall. Panel 3b plots the residual of a regression of log(loan volume) on firm∗time fixed effects that
absorb unobservable change in loan demand. After absorbing demand effects, both lines reflect changes in loan supply.
Diversified banks do not reduce loan supply during the crisis and increase it in the following years, while concentrated
banks reduce loan volume during and after the crisis. For detailed variable definitions see Table 17 and text.
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Figure 4: Diversification and international portfolio
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Note: This figure shows the relationship between banks’ portfolio diversification (DIV) and the international allocation of
their loan portfolio (INT) on the loan level. The blue dashed line is a quadratic fit. Higher values denote more portfolio
diversification, and a higher share of loans extended to foreign borrowers, respectively. For detailed variable definitions see
Table 17 and text.
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Figure 5: Macro evidence
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Note: This figure shows the relationship between our sample data and aggregate data on total credit, as well as our
diversification metric and aggregate measures of financial integration. All scatter plots depict scatter points as well as a
linear fit, where the underlying data is aggregated to the country-year level. For detailed variable definitions see Table 17
and text.
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Figure 6: Banks’ diversification over time
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Note: This figure shows the change in banks’ diversification over time. Diversification is computed according to Equation
(1). It plots the mean, median, 25th, and 75th percentile from 1995 to 2012. Diversification increased steadily until around
2006, but then decreased during the recent global financial crisis and remains depressed ever since. Less-diversified banks
drive the decline. For detailed variable definitions see Table 17 and text.
Table 1: Summary statistics − by region
loans firms banks DIV BC
East Asia and Pacific 386973 8767 1642 266 28
Europe and Central Asia 379177 6033 1118 269 128
Latin America and Caribbean 39622 626 126 21 24
Middle East and North Africa 30164 334 176 54 0
North America 860634 19176 3711 74 6
South Asia 20379 458 116 8 0
Sub-Saharan Africa 7124 116 73 14 3
Total 1724073 35510 6962 706 189
Note: This table shows the geographic distribution of our sample. loans denotes the number of firm-bank-year observations,
firms and banks the number of individual firms and banks. DIV stands for diversification and denotes the number of
banks with non-zero portfolio diversification. Finally, BC stands for banking crisis and denotes the number of country-year
observations with banking crises. For detailed variable definitions see Table 17 and text.
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Table 2: Summary statistics − loan level
diversified concentrated mean diff.
mean sd mean sd t
∆ loan volume 0.02 (0.36) 0.01 (0.34) -17.00
loan volume (m) 101.67 (296.04) 75.53 (266.63) -60.94
loan spread (bp) 137.08 (107.52) 191.17 (131.07) 263.55
maturity (months) 76.12 (49.16) 71.39 (42.22) -67.76
Observations 854370 869703 1724073
Note: This table shows descriptive statistics on the firm-bank-year (loan) level. The sample is split by the yearly median
according to banks’ diversification. Highly diversified observations are denoted diversified, those with low diversification as
concentrated. mean denotes the mean, sd the standard deviation, and mean diff. the t-value for the difference in means
across both groups. For detailed variable definitions see Table 17 and text.
Table 3: Summary statistics − firm level Dealscan
high exposure low exposure mean diff.
mean sd mean sd t
∆ loan volume 0.04 (0.39) 0.03 (0.39) -2.34
loan volume (m) 763.80 (1982.62) 323.47 (723.77) -65.52
loan spread (bp) 169.81 (130.74) 235.06 (137.16) 92.05
maturity (months) 83.62 (64.15) 64.91 (42.38) -76.95
Observations 99948 99986 199934
Note: This table shows descriptive statistics on the firm-year (firm) level for the full sample of Dealscan firms. The sample
is split by the yearly median according to firms’ exposure. High exposure firms are denoted high exposure, those with low
exposure as low exposure. mean denotes the mean, sd the standard deviation, and mean diff. the t-value for the difference
in means across both groups. For detailed variable definitions see Table 17 and text.
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Table 4: Summary statistics − firm level Compustat
high exposure low exposure mean diff.
mean sd mean sd t
∆ employment 0.03 (0.17) 0.03 (0.20) 2.96
∆ investment 0.03 (0.59) 0.04 (0.64) 2.66
∆ sales 0.07 (0.32) 0.09 (0.22) 6.66
investment ratio 0.22 (1.39) 0.23 (0.26) 1.71
return on assets 0.06 (0.08) 0.06 (0.11) -4.76
employment (th) 17.04 (37.40) 6.48 (15.09) -45.22
log total assets 8.51 (2.30) 6.48 (2.06) -115.61
market to book ratio 1.58 (1.01) 1.61 (1.11) 2.06
long-term debt ratio 0.25 (0.20) 0.24 (0.22) -7.53
Observations 29613 33168 62781
Note: This table shows descriptive statistics on the firm-year (firm) level for the smaller sample of matched Compustat
firms. The sample is split by the yearly median according to firms’ exposure. High exposure firms are denoted high
exposure, those with low exposure as low exposure. mean denotes the mean, sd the standard deviation, and mean diff. the
t-value for the difference in means across both groups. For detailed variable definitions see Table 17 and text.
Table 5: Risk − firm level
high exposure low exposure mean diff.
mean sd mean sd t
investment growth sd 0.54 (0.32) 0.62 (0.37) 10.63
employment growth sd 0.14 (0.10) 0.16 (0.12) 7.20
assets growth sd 0.18 (0.14) 0.20 (0.16) 6.87
sales growth sd 0.18 (0.12) 0.19 (0.14) 2.94
Observations 3689 3893 7582
Note: This table shows descriptive statistics on the firm-year (firm) level for the smaller sample of matched Compustat
firms. Risk is defined as firms’ standard deviation of investment/employment/asset7sales growth in non-crisis times. The
sample is split by the yearly median according to firms’ exposure. High exposure firms are denoted high exposure, those
with low exposure as low exposure. mean denotes the mean, sd the standard deviation, and mean diff. the t-value for the
difference in means across both groups. For detailed variable definitions see Table 17 and text.
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A.2 Results
A.2.1 Main Results
Table 6: Loan level − loan supply
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
full sample full sample full sample KM sample KM sample KM sample
VARIABLES log loan volume log loan volume log loan volume log loan volume log loan volume log loan volume
banking crisis (BC) 0.040 -0.005
(0.029) (0.017)
diversification (DIV) 0.309*** 0.005 0.013 0.199*** 0.047** 0.063***
(0.060) (0.018) (0.017) (0.061) (0.019) (0.021)
DIV × BC 0.135*** 0.039*** 0.063*** 0.145*** 0.056*** 0.071***
(0.026) (0.013) (0.013) (0.028) (0.021) (0.023)
Observations 1,724,073 1,691,064 1,724,073 666,119 664,935 665,949
R-squared 0.954 0.976 0.965 0.966 0.979 0.975
Firm*Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm*Year FE - Yes - - Yes -
Country*Industry*Year FE - - Yes - - Yes
Cluster Country*Year Country*Year Country*Year Country*Year Country*Year Country*Year
Note: This table shows regressions on the bank-firm-year (loan) level. The dependent variable is log of total outstanding
loan volume; banking crisis (BC) is a dummy with value one during banking crises in the firm country, as defined in Laeven
and Valencia (2013); diversification (DIV) is banks’ portfolio diversification. For detailed variable definitions see Table
17 and text. All standard errors are clustered at the firm country-year level. full sample denotes the full sample with all
loan-level observations, while KM sample restricts the sample to firms that borrow from diversified and concentrated banks
in each year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
45
Table 7: Firm level − loan growth
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES ∆ loan volume ∆ loan volume ∆ loan volume
banking crisis -0.142***
(0.006)
exposure -0.475*** -0.185*** -0.182***
(0.019) (0.021) (0.022)
exposure × BC 0.055*** 0.050*** 0.039**
(0.014) (0.017) (0.019)
Observations 196,337 196,337 196,038
R-squared 0.138 0.172 0.317
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Country*Year FE - Yes -
Country*Industry*Year FE - - Yes
Cluster Firm Firm Firm
Note: This table shows regressions on the firm-year (firm) level. The dependent variable is log difference of firms’ total
outstanding loan volume; banking crisis (BC) is a dummy with value one during banking crises in the firm country, as
defined in Laeven and Valencia (2013); exposure is firms’ exposure to diversified banks. For detailed variable definitions
see Table 17 and text. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 8: Firm level − real effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES ∆ long-term debt ∆ long-term debt ∆ employment ∆ employment ∆ investment ∆ investment
banking crisis -0.084*** -0.064*** -0.131***
(0.023) (0.006) (0.017)
exposure -0.269*** -0.261*** -0.155*** -0.074*** -0.242*** -0.163***
(0.037) (0.049) (0.013) (0.014) (0.032) (0.038)
exposure × BC 0.131*** 0.105* 0.071*** 0.029** 0.123*** 0.119***
(0.043) (0.057) (0.012) (0.014) (0.034) (0.042)
Observations 53,574 49,340 51,445 47,496 54,638 51,845
R-squared 0.172 0.233 0.279 0.349 0.137 0.231
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country*Year FE - Yes - Yes - Yes
Controls - Yes - Yes - Yes
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Note: This table shows regressions on the firm-year (firm) level. The dependent variables are log difference of firms’ long-
term debt, employment, and investment; banking crisis (BC) is a dummy with value one during banking crises in the firm
country, as defined in Laeven and Valencia (2013); exposure is firms’ exposure to diversified banks. log total assets, return
on assets, and leverage are firm-level controls. For detailed variable definitions see Table 17 and text. All standard errors
are clustered at the firm level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9: Bank level − Spillover effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES ∆ loan vol. ∆ loan vol. ∆ loan vol. ∆ loan vol. ∆ loan vol.
banking crisis (BC) -0.030*** -0.054*** -0.049*** -0.068*** -0.022*
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.012)
connected -0.029*** -0.063*** -0.039***
(0.006) (0.012) (0.014)
diversification (DIV) -0.018 -0.034* -0.042**
(0.019) (0.018) (0.019)
DIV × BC 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.027
(0.014) (0.014) (0.017)
DIV × connected 0.064*** 0.061***
(0.018) (0.018)
Observations 167,213 167,213 167,213 167,213 166,976
R-squared 0.212 0.212 0.212 0.213 0.237
Bank*Borrower Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes -
Bank Country*Year FE - - - - Yes
Controls macro macro macro macro macro
Cluster Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Note: This table shows regressions on the bank-firm country-year (bank) level. The dependent variable is log of total
outstanding loan volume by bank b to all borrowers in country j; banking crisis (BC) is a dummy with value one during
banking crises in the firm country, as defined in Laeven and Valencia (2013); diversification (DIV) is banks’ portfolio
diversification. connected is a dummy with value one when BC = 1 for all countries connected to bank b that are not
country j and have no contemporaneous banking crisis. All regressions include borrower-country macroeconomic controls
trade (in % of GDP), inflation rate, log GDP per capita, and log population. For detailed variable definitions see Table 17
and text. All standard errors are clustered at the bank level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 10: FDIC SDI − Mechanism
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES log deposits log deposits log deposits log time dep. log demand dep. log money market dep.
loans in crisis -0.640*** 0.085 0.089 0.106 -0.243** -0.138
(0.212) (0.058) (0.066) (0.099) (0.107) (0.268)
diversification (DIV) 0.240 0.228 0.016 0.255 0.435**
(0.156) (0.137) (0.331) (0.376) (0.176)
DIV × loans in crisis 6.290** 6.340** 0.747 24.402*** 11.786*
(2.734) (2.757) (7.667) (6.500) (6.716)
Observations 6,446 6,446 6,446 6,074 6,021 5,909
R-squared 0.930 0.991 0.991 0.949 0.962 0.983
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE - - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster State State State State State State
Note: This table shows regressions on the bank-quarter level for FDIC SDI data (US banks only). The dependent variables
are log deposits; loans in crisis is banks’ share of loans extended to countries with a banking crisis, as defined in Laeven
and Valencia (2013); diversification (DIV) is banks’ portfolio diversification. All regressions include log(assets), tier 1
capital ratio, net interest margin, and return on assets as bank-level controls. For detailed variable definitions see Table
17 and text. All standard errors are clustered at the US state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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A.2.2 Extensions
Table 11: Foreign and international banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES log loan volume log loan volume log loan volume log loan volume log loan volume log loan volume log loan volume
diversification (DIV) -0.002 0.005 -0.024 -0.116*** -0.102***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.022) (0.027) (0.025)
DIV × BC 0.080*** 0.077*** 0.059*** 0.067*** 0.018
(0.015) (0.011) (0.017) (0.017) (0.034)
foreign bank × BC -0.016** -0.044*** -0.019**
(0.008) (0.011) (0.009)
DIV × foreign bank 0.006
(0.007)
DIV × foreign bank × BC -0.045***
(0.010)
int. portfolio (INT) 0.047*** 0.059*** 0.011 0.023
(0.013) (0.018) (0.022) (0.023)
INT × BC 0.023** -0.016 -0.026 -0.084***
(0.012) (0.017) (0.016) (0.024)
DIV × INT 0.158*** 0.132***
(0.036) (0.035)
DIV × INT × BC 0.120**
(0.059)
Observations 1,691,064 1,691,064 1,691,064 1,691,064 1,691,064 1,691,064 1,691,064
R-squared 0.976 0.976 0.976 0.976 0.976 0.976 0.976
Firm*Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Country*Year Country*Year Country*Year Country*Year Country*Year Country*Year Country*Year
Note: This table shows regressions on the bank-firm-year (loan) level. The dependent variable is log of total outstanding
loan volume; banking crisis (BC) is a dummy with value one during banking crises in the firm country, as defined in
Laeven and Valencia (2013); diversification (DIV) is banks’ portfolio diversification. foreign bank is a dummy with value
one if bank country and firm country differ. In column (3), DIV is a dummy with value 1 if a bank has above median
diversification in a given year. int. portfolio (INT) is banks’ portfolio share that is extended to foreign borrowers. For
detailed variable definitions see Table 17 and text. All standard errors are clustered at the firm country-year level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 12: Crisis loans and portfolio risk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES log loan volume log loan volume log loan volume log loan volume log loan volume log loan volume
diversification (DIV) 0.001 0.002 -0.017 -0.025 -0.025 -0.024*
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.013)
DIV × BC 0.054*** -0.033 0.026** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.037***
(0.013) (0.033) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010)
share of loans in crisis 0.010 0.011
(0.014) (0.014)
BC × share of loans in crisis 0.032 -0.030
(0.020) (0.033)
DIV × BC × share of loans in crisis 0.099**
(0.041)
portfolio risk (sales) × BC -0.021*** -0.021***
(0.003) (0.006)
DIV × portfolio risk (sales) × BC -0.002
(0.011)
Observations 1,691,064 1,691,064 1,596,872 1,596,872 1,596,872 1,691,064
R-squared 0.976 0.976 0.974 0.974 0.974 0.990
Firm*Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Size*Year FE - - - - - Yes
Cluster Country*Year Country*Year Country*Year Country*Year Country*Year Country*Year
Note: This table shows regressions on the bank-firm-year (loan) level. The dependent variable is log of total outstanding
loan volume; banking crisis (BC) is a dummy with value one during banking crises in the firm country, as defined in Laeven
and Valencia (2013); diversification (DIV) is banks’ portfolio diversification. share of loans in crisis denotes banks’ share
of total loans extended to countries that suffer a banking crisis. portfolio risk (sales) is banks’ portfolio risk, measured
as the average standard deviation of borrowers’ sales growth in non-crisis times. Column (6) includes time-varying fixed
effects for quintiles of loan size (Bank Size∗Year FE). For detailed variable definitions see Table 17 and text. All standard
errors are clustered at the firm country-year level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
A.2.3 Robustness
Table 13: Firm level − financial constraints
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
uncons. cons. uncons. cons. uncons. cons. uncons. cons.
payout payout size size payout payout size size
VARIABLES ∆ employment ∆ employment ∆ employment ∆ employment ∆ investment ∆ investment ∆ investment ∆ investment
exposure -0.055* -0.103*** -0.033 -0.033 0.024 -0.265*** -0.075 -0.106
(0.029) (0.032) (0.024) (0.024) (0.080) (0.083) (0.067) (0.079)
exposure × BC -0.003 0.094*** 0.063 0.041* -0.058 0.277** -0.077 0.201**
(0.024) (0.033) (0.041) (0.025) (0.072) (0.109) (0.134) (0.084)
Observations 11,347 12,207 15,598 15,433 12,017 12,808 16,742 16,660
R-squared 0.336 0.472 0.333 0.413 0.272 0.317 0.249 0.260
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Note: This table shows regressions on the firm-year (firm) level. The dependent variables are log difference of firms’
employment and investment; banking crisis (BC) is a dummy with value one during banking crises in the firm country, as
defined in Laeven and Valencia (2013); exposure is firms’ exposure to diversified banks. All regressions include log total
assets, return on assets, and leverage as firm-level controls. uncons. and cons. denote constrained and unconstrained
firms, split into bottom and top tercile of payout ratio or size for each year. For detailed variable definitions see Table 17
and text. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 14: Firm level − maturity and sample selection
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1995-2008 GFC regional crisis
VARIABLES loan spread maturity ∆ loan volume ∆ loan volume ∆ loan volume
exposure -35.486*** 6.392*** -0.249*** -0.186*** -0.182***
(6.932) (1.763) (0.027) (0.022) (0.022)
exposure × BC 30.816*** 2.636 0.070*** 0.057*** 0.054**
(6.288) (1.899) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
exposure × GFC 0.066**
(0.025)
exposure × GFC × BC -0.100***
(0.031)
exposure × regional BC -0.029*
(0.018)
Observations 139,505 199,799 133,542 196,038 196,038
R-squared 0.905 0.951 0.338 0.317 0.317
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country*Industry*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Note: This table shows regressions on the firm-year (firm) level. The dependent variable is firms’ average loan spread over
LIBOR (in basis points) and maturity (in months) in columns (1) and (2), and log difference of firms’ total outstanding
loan volume in columns (3)-(5); banking crisis (BC) is a dummy with value one during banking crises in the firm country,
as defined in Laeven and Valencia (2013); exposure is firms’ exposure to diversified banks. Great Financial Crisis (GFC) is
a dummy with value one during banking crises from 2008-2010. regional crisis is a dummy with value one during regional
banking crises in Asia, Latin America, and Europe. For detailed variable definitions see Table 17 and text. All standard
errors are clustered at the firm level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 15: Substitution towards diversified lenders
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
firm firm firm firm industry industry industry industry
t t+1 t+2 t+3 t t+1 t+2 t+3
VARIABLES exposure exposure exposure exposure exposure exposure exposure exposure
banking crisis 0.007*** 0.006** 0.010*** 0.007** 0.003 0.005 0.012*** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 192,495 155,610 123,045 98,076 192,495 159,703 127,892 101,469
R-squared 0.924 0.926 0.928 0.928 0.505 0.497 0.489 0.485
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes - - - -
Country*Industry FE - - - - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Note: This table shows regressions on the firm-year (firm) level. The dependent variable is firms’ exposure to diversified
banks (the share of total loans extended by diversified banks), where we lead the dependent variable by up to 3 periods.
banking crisis (BC) is a dummy with value one during banking crises in the firm country, as defined in Laeven and Valencia
(2013). Columns (1)-(4) use firm fixed effects and look at within firm variation, columns (5)-(8) use country-industry fixed
effects and look at changes across firms within industries. For detailed variable definitions see Table 17 and text. All
standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 16: Diversified banks increase their loan share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
t t t+1 t+2 t+3
VARIABLES share share share share share
banking crisis (BC) -0.007*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.010***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
diversification (DIV) -0.310*** -0.198*** -0.125*** -0.067***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
DIV × BC 0.013*** 0.008* 0.005 0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Observations 199,427 173,368 149,664 127,568 109,366
R-squared 0.959 0.967 0.968 0.970 0.971
Bank*Borrower Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Country*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Note: This table shows regressions on the bank-firm country-year (bank) level. The dependent variable is banks’ share of
total outstanding loan volume extended to all borrowers in country j, up to a lead of three years; banking crisis (BC) is a
dummy with value one during banking crises in the firm country, as defined in Laeven and Valencia (2013); diversification
(DIV) is banks’ portfolio diversification. For detailed variable definitions see Table 17 and text. All standard errors are
clustered at the bank level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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B Variable Definitions
Table 17: Variable definitions
variable description/item unit/comment
loan volume outstanding syndicated loans million
loan spread interest spread over LIBOR basis points
maturity loan maturity months
banking crisis (BC) banking crisis in borrower country dummy
connected connected countries with no contemporaneous banking crisis dummy
diversification (DIV) diversification index [0,1-1/J], bank level
exposure firm exposure to diversified banks [0,1-1/J], firm level
investment ratio capx/ppentt−1 (CS) %
long-term debt ratio dltt/at (CS) %
employment emp (CS) thousand
sales sale (CS) million
assets at (CS) million
return on assets (ROA) (opid - depam)/at (CS) %
sales growth ln(salet) - ln(salet−1) (CS) %
payout ratio (dvt + prstkc)/oibdp (CS) %
fixed assets ppe (CS) million
capital-labor ratio ppe/emp (CS) %
foreign bank (FB) borrower country 6= lender country dummy, bank level
international portfolio (INT) int. loan volume to total loan volume [0,1], bank level
great financial crisis (GFC) years 2008-2010 dummy
regional BC regional banking crisis for Asia, Latin America, Europe, and US dummy
home BC banking crisis in lender country dummy, bank level
share of loans in crisis share of syndicated loans extended to crisis countries in year t %
portfolio risk (sales) standard deviation of borrower sales growth in non-crisis times
credit to GDP FD.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS (WB WDI) %
BIS foreign claims total cross-border claims (BIS CBS) %
BIS foreign liabilities total cross-border liabilities (BIS CBS) %
foreign bank assets as share of total bank assets (WB GFDD) %
Note: CS stands for Compustat, WB for World Bank, GFDD for Global Financial Development Database, WDI for World
Development Indicators, BIS for Bank for International Settlements, CBS for Consolidated Banking Statistics.
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